Abstract-The wide popularity of Kerberos made it the de-facto standard for authentication in enterprise networks. Moreover, the lightweight nature of Kerberos makes it a candidate of choice for securing network communications in emerging non-enterprise information systems such as industrial control networks, building automation and intelligent transportation systems. Many of these potential applications of Kerberos involve infrastructures characterized by their large scale and strict dependability requirements. However, such requirements may not be met when crossrealm Kerberos operations are involved. In this paper, we outline the issues with the current Kerberos crossrealm model and present XKDCP (Inter Key Distribution Center Protocol), a new Kerberos cross-realm authentication model that improves on scalability and dependability by (1) relying on public key cryptography to dynamically maintain direct trust relationships between Kerberos realms and (2) adopting a proxy model to offload inter-domain exchanges and processing from the low-end devices to the Kerberos authentication servers.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the recent advances in communication technologies for low-power devices, 1 , the Internet is spreading to new domains beyond legacy enterprise and personal computing to realize what is called the ubiquitous computing paradigm. Applications such as Industrial Automation [3] , Intelligent Transportation Systems [4] and Energy management [5] aim at empowering traditionally non networked devices with computing and networking capabilities. The interconnected 'smart' devices collaborate as a global distributed system to infuse intelligence into systems and processes that make the world work.
As our everyday life is increasingly relying on ubiquitous computing systems, the dependability of such systems is important not only for the convenience of the service they provide, but also to ensure that financial assets and human lives that are at stake are safe. 1 Technologies such as IEEE 802.15.4 [1] and 6LOW-PAN [2] The adoption of legacy network services as part of the infrastructure supporting new ubiquitous applications is a natural evolutionary approach to technology that allows new systems to build on top of existing knowledge and technologies. However, the ubiquitous computing paradigm does not have the same requirements as those related to traditional enterprise and personal computing. Indeed, ubiquitous computing in domains such as industrial automation, energy management and health care is characterized by a larger scale and a higher dependability requirements when compared to enterprise and personal computing.
To ensure the dependability of ubiquitous applications, network services upon which these applications are built must be robust and embed dependability paradigms in their design. When adopting legacy network services such as network layer routing and access control, it is essential to take in consideration the new requirements of the ubiquitous computing environment.
The Kerberos protocol [6] , which is the de-facto standard authentication system for enterprise networks, has several characteristics that makes it an ideal candidate for implementing authentication systems for ubiquitous applications. Two of the main characteristics consist of re-use of cached security credentials and the use of lightweight symmetric key cryptography. However, some aspects of the Kerberos authentication protocol that are not of particular importance for small scale enterprise networks may represent serious dependability issues when Kerberos is used for large scale infrastructures supporting ubiquitous applications.
The dependability issues of Kerberos lies in its crossrealm operations. The cross-realm authentication capabilities in Kerberos, which allow an administrative domain (called Kerberos realm) to authenticate entities that belong to other administrative domains, suffer from scalability and security issues as we stated in a previous work [7] . The objective of this paper is to outline the shortcomings of the Kerberos cross-realm authentication model and propose a new protocol that solves these issues. The proposed protocol called the Inter Key Distribution Center Protocol (XKDCP) allows a client to obtain authentication credentials for a service managed by a remote realm in a single round trip. The single round-trip feature of XKDCP represents an important performance benefit for devices with low processing power. The XKDCP cross-realm model also provides better scalability and more reliability by leveraging public key cryptography to establish direct trust relationships between realms. In a previous work [8] , we have outlined the overall benefits from improving cross-realm operations in Kerberos. We then followed by an initial technical specification of the XKDCP protocol within the IETF [9] . This paper reports on the the most up to date specification of the XKDCP protocol. A comparison with related works is also provided.
II. THE KERBEROS AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL

A. Overview
Kerberos [6] is a widely deployed authentication system. The authentication process in Kerberos involves principals and a Key Distribution Center (KDC). Principals represent users and services registered in the Kerberos domain or realm. The KDC maintains a database of principals and shares a secret key with each one of them. In order to access an actual service, the client must submit valid Kerberos credentials to the service. The Kerberos protocol specifies three exchanges, the Authentication Server (AS) exchange, the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) exchange and the Client Server (AP) exchange. The three exchanges are depicted in Figure. 1. The AS exchange allows the client to obtain credentials that it can use to prove its identity to the KDC. These credentials consist of a Ticket 2 referred to as Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT), and the associated session key referred to as TGS session key.
The TGS exchange, on the other hand, allows the client to authenticate to the KDC using the TGT and to obtain a Ticket for a certain service. After validating the client request (TGS-REQ), the KDC issues a Ticket for the client and sends it along with the associated session key in a TGS Reply message (TGS-REP).
The AP exchange is performed between the client and the service to authenticate the client before granting it access to the resources. The client initiates the authentication by issuing an AP Request message (AP-REQ) that contains a Ticket for the service. After validating the client's credentials the service authorizes the client, and optionally sends an AP Reply message (AP-REP) to achieve mutual authentication. The Kerberos protocol offers cross-realm authentication capabilities. This allows users to obtain service tickets to access resources in foreign realms. In order to access such services, the users first contact their home KDC asking for a TGT that will be used with the (Ticket Granting Server) TGS of the foreign realm (message 1 of Figure  . 2). If the home realm and the foreign realm share keys and have an established trust relationship, the home KDC delivers the requested TGT.
B. Kerberos cross-realm authentication
However, if the home realm does not share inter-realm keys with the foreign realm, the home KDC will provide a TGT that can be used with an intermediary foreign realm that is likely to be sharing inter-realm keys with the target realm. The client would then use this 'intermediary TGT' to communicate with the intermediary KDC (message 2 of Figure. 2) which will iterate the actions taken by the home KDC: If the intermediary KDC does not share cross-realm keys with the target foreign realm, then it will point the user to another intermediary KDC (just as in the first exchange between the user and its home KDC). However, in the other case (when it shares inter-realm keys with the target realm), the intermediary KDC will issue a TGT that can be used with the KDC of the target realm. This mechanism is referred to as cross-realm referral. 
K(X,Y)
A long-term key shared between the entities X and Y.
SK(X,Y)
A short-term session-key shared between the entities X and Y.
Ax
The result of encrypting the content A with the key x. The key x can be a symmetric key or a public/private key.
Pub(X)
The Public key of the entity X.
Pri(X)
The private key of the entity X. TimeStamp* A freshly generated time stamp.
TKT(X,Y,Z)
A ticket delivered by Z to X for authentication with the service Y.
TABLE I KERBEROS TERMINOLOGY AND NOTATION
After iterating through the intermediary realms using the same referral mechanism, the client would obtain a TGT for the desired foreign realm then use it to obtain service tickets from the TGS of the foreign realm (message 5 of Figure. 2). Finally the user authenticates to the service using the service ticket. Figure. 2 shows the exchanges between the different entities involved in a cross-realm authentication aiming at delivering a service ticket to a client when the service is deployed in a foreign realm.
III. ISSUES IN KERBEROS CROSS-REALM OPERATIONS
The cross-realm support in Kerberos was added in the version 5 of the Kerberos specification [10] . In contrast with other parts of Kerberos that have been extensively reviewed and enhanced, such as "Encryption and checksum Specification" [11] and "Kerberos Cryptosystem Negotiation Extension" [12] , the cross-realm operations have not been updated since. As a result, the crossrealm operations fail to catch-up with the requirements introduced by new application domains such as mobility, control and automation. The applicability of Kerberos cross-realm operations in such domains present some issues. We previously outlined these issues with the IETF Kerberos working group [7] . This section provides an overview of the issues in Kerberos cross-realm operations that the XKDCP protocol aims to solve.
A. Scalability of Inter-realm trust management
In Kerberos, the cross-realm operations are based on trust relationships between the Kerberos realms. There are two types of inter-realm trust relationships: Direct and Indirect (or transitive) trust relationship. A direct trust relationship means that the two realms involved in the cross-realm authentication share keys and their respective TGS principals are registered in each other's KDC. When only direct trust relationships are used, the KDC of each realm must maintain keys with all foreign realms. This can become a cumbersome task when the number of realms increase.
The indirect trust relationship attempts to improve the direct trust relationship model by allowing two realms to perform cross-realm operations if there exist a chain of trust (also referred to as authentication path) that links the participating realms. However, the determination of the authentication path is an issue, there are no generic and scalable means by which the Kerberos KDC or client can dynamically discover possible authentication paths and chains of trusts between two realms.
B. Reliability and Forward Secrecy
When intermediary realms are involved, the success of the cross-realm authentication completely depends on the realms that are part of the authentication path. If any of the realms in the authentication path is not available, then the principals of the end-realms can not perform crossrealm operations. This constitutes a reliability issue that can fail Kerberos as a candidate authentication system for mission-critical deployments such as large factory automation and military applications.
Moreover, during cross-realm authentication, any KDC in the authentication path can learn the session key that will be used between the client and the desired service, this means that any intermediary realm is able to spoof the identify of the service and the client as well as to eavesdrop on the communication between the client and the server. If an intermediary KDC is corrupted, all the authentication operations using the corrupted KDC as intermediary KDC will be corrupted. The forward secrecy issue in cross-realm operations is a serious problem, it makes the whole web of trust as vulnerable as the weakest KDC.
C. Client centric exchanges
During cross-realm operations, Kerberos clients have to perform TGS exchanges with all the KDCs in the trust path, including the home KDC and the target KDC. In some cases where the client has limited computational capabilities, the overhead of these cross-realm exchanges may grow into unacceptable delays. Furthermore, if the number of intermediary realms increases, the delay introduced by the cross-realm messages can result in unacceptable delays due to network latency. This effect can be experienced even with devices with superior performance.
IV. THE XKDCP CROSS-REALM AUTHENTICATION
PROTOCOL: OVERVIEW The Inter KDC Protocol (XKDCP) is an extension to the Kerberos protocol specification offering a new cross- 
TGS-REP XKDCP-REQ (2) Fig. 3 . Kerberos cross-realm authentication using XKDCP realm authentication model for Kerberos that addresses the issues stated in Section .III.
As illustrated in Figure. 3, with XKDCP, a client (C) may issue a TGS-REQ for a service (SVC-R) registered in a remote realm (R) to any KDC for which the client has a valid TGT (Such KDC is denoted as KDC-H for "Home KDC"). From the client's point of view, KDC-H delivers the ticket as if the remote service was registered in the home realm. The cross-realm operations are managed by KDC-H and made transparent to the client. To enable this mode of operations, the XKDCP extension defines a protocol between two Kerberos key distribution centers (KDCs) that enables a home KDC to obtain the necessary information from a remote KDC to build a ticket for a remote service and deliver it to the requesting client. This allows the simplification of Kerberos cross-realm operations by enabling clients to obtain credentials from their home KDCs in a single round-trip without having to exchange messages with KDCs deployed in remote intermediary realms as it is the case with the traditional Kerberos cross-realm authentication model.
In order to build a ticket for a service deployed in a remote realm, KDC-H needs to have a Ticket "TKT(C,SVC-R,KDC-R)", encrypted using the secret key of the remote service, and build an "EncTGSRepPart" (As defined in [6] ) that contains the key K(C,SVC-R). EncTGSRepPart is built by KDC-H and is encrypted using the session key "K(C,KDC-H)". The key "K(C,SVC-R)" and the associated ticket "TKT(C,SVC-R,KDC-R)", on the other hand, are built by the remote KDC and sent to the home KDC in a secure manner. Once these components are received, the home KDC can build a TGS-REP message containing the credentials requested by the client. The exchange between the two KDCs to deliver the cryptographic information "K(C,SVC-R)" and "TKT(C,SVC-R,KDC-R)" to KDC-H is specified by XKDCP and consists of the two messages XKDCP-REQ and XKDCP-REP as illustrated in Figure  3 .
The XKDCP protocol uses PKINIT [13] to maintain inter-realm keys used to secure XKDCP exchanges. The PKINIT specification was originally specified for performing public-key authentication between a client and the KDC when the client and the KDC do not share a long term secret key. In XKDCP, the home KDC uses PKINIT when there is no inter-realm key (represented as K(H,R)) between the home realm and the remote realm.
With regard to the use of PKINIT in XKDCP, we distinguish two cases depending on whether the home KDC and the remote KDC share an inter-realm key or not. If the inter-realm key exists, then the key is used to secure the XKDCP exchange, and PKINIT is not used. If the inter-realm key does not exist, then the the PKINIT extension is used to secure the XKDCP exchange and generate a new inter-realm key between the two KDCs.
V. THE XKDCP CROSS-REALM AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL: DETAILED OPERATIONS
In the following we assume that a client C, that has a TGT for a home realm H, wishes to access a service SVC-R deployed in a remote realm R. We explain in this section how the XKDCP extension can be used to allow the client C to obtain a service ticket "TKT(C,SVC-R,KDC-R)" and the associated session key from the home KDC.
The operations of the XKDCP protocol differs depending on whether an inter-realm key between KDC-H and KDC-R exists. We distinguish two cases :
A. Case 1: XKDCP operations when KDCs share a secret key
This corresponds to the case where the inter-realm key "K(KDC-H,KDC-R)" between the two realms exists. The message exchange that corresponds to this case is illustrated in Figure. 4.
1) The client starts by sending a TGS-REQ (as defined in [6] ) to the home KDC (KDC-H) asking for credentials required to access a certain remote service (SVC-R). The TGS-REQ message includes a TGT for KDC-H "TKT(C,KDC-H,KDC-S)" and an Authenticator. The client asks the home KDC for tickets independently whether the service belongs to the home realm or not. The difference with [6] consists in the fact that the client must fill the cname field of the TGS-REQ message with the principal name of the service (SVC-R). [6] specifies that this field is left empty in TGS-REQ messages.
2) KDC-H starts by verifying the authenticator and the TGT. If the verification succeeds it processes the request as follows: If KDC-H received a TGS-REQ for a service that is registered in a remote realm R (Information provided by the client in 'srealm') it initiates an XKDCP exchange by issuing an XKDCP-REQ message to the KDC of the remote realm (KDC-R). The XKDCP-REQ message consists of a copy of the client's TGS-REQ 
1) C ⇒ KDC-H : TGS-REQ TGS-REQ = C, SVC-R, R, Options, Times TKT(C,KDC-H,AS-H), Auth(C,KDC-H)
2) KDC-H ⇒ KDC-R : XKDCP-REQ XKDCP-REQ = TGS-REQ, Auth(KDC-H,KDC-R)
3) KDC-R ⇒ KDC-H : XKDCP-REP XKDCP-REP = TKT(C,SVC-R,KDC-R), EncTGSRepPart EncTGSRepPart = {SK(C, SV C − R), options, times} K(KDC−H,KDC−R)
4) KDC-H ⇒ C : TGS-REP TGS-REP = TKT(C,SVC-R,KDC-R), EncTGSRepPart EncTGSRepPart = {SK(C, SV C − R), options, times} SK(C,KDC−H)
1) C ⇒ KDC-H : TGS-REQ TGS-REQ = C, SVC-R, R, Options, Times, TKT(C,KDC-H,AS-H), Auth(C,KDC-H)
2) KDC-H ⇒ KDC-R : XKDCP-REQ XKDCP-REQ = TGS-REQ, PA-PK-AS-REQ PA-PK-AS-REQ = {cksum, T imeStamp} P ri(KDC−H)
3) KDC-R ⇒ KDC-H : XKDCP-REP XKDCP-REP = TKT(C,SVC-R,KDC-R), EncTGSRepPart, PA-PK-AS-REP EncTGSRepPart = {SK(C, SV C − R), options, times} K(KDC−H,KDC−R)
PA-PK-AS-REP = {{cksum, K(KDC − H, KDC − R)} P ub(KDC−H) } P ri(KDC−R)
4) KDC-H ⇒ C : TGS-REP TGS-REP = TKT(C,SVC-R,KDC-R), EncTGSRepPart EncTGSRepPart = {SK(C, SV C − R), options, times} SK(C,KDC−H)
Fig. 5. Case 2: XKDCP operations when KDCs do not share a secret key message and an Authenticator. The Authenticator, which ensures replay protection as well as message integrity and authentication, contains a time-stamp and a check-sum over the TGS-REQ message. The home KDC encrypts the Authenticator using the inter-realm key K(KDC-H,KDC-R).
3) The remote KDC verifies the authenticator and builds an XKDCP-REP message. The XKDCP-REP message consists of two main parts: A Ticket and an EncTGSRepPart (see [6] for details about these components). The EncTicketPart of the Ticket is encrypted using the secret key of the service SVC-R "K(SVC-R,KDC-R)", shared with KDC-R. The EncTGSRepPart is encrypted using the interrealm key "K(KDC-H,KDC-R)" shared between KDC-H and KDC-R. Both the EncTicketPart of the Ticket and the EncTGSRepPart contain the same session-key "SK(C,SVC-R)". This session-key will be shared between the client and the service.
4) KDC-H extracts and decrypts the EncTGSRepPart
from the XKDCP-REP message using the interrealm key "K(KDC-H,KDC-R)", then encrypts it using the TGS session key shared with the client "SK(C,KDC-H)". A TGS-REP message is then built using the newly generated EncTGSRepPart and the Ticket as received from KDC-R. Finally, the client processes this TGS-REP message as specified in [6] .
B. Case 2: XKDCP operations when KDCs do not share a secret key
This corresponds to the case when there is no interrealm key shared between the home realm and the remote realm where the service is deployed. The message exchange that corresponds to this case is illustrated in Figure. 5.
1) The behavior of the client is the same whether the home and the remote realms share inter-realm key or not. The client thus sends TGS-REQ message as described in "Case 1".
2) When KDC-H receives a TGS-REQ for a service that is registered in a remote realm R, it initiates an XKDCP exchange by issuing an XKDCP-REQ message to the TGS of the remote realm (KDC-R).
The XKDCP-REQ consists of the client's TGS-REQ message to which a PA-PK-AS-REQ [13] (a PKINIT request) is added. The PA-PK-AS-REQ contains a check-sum over the TGS-REQ message and time-stamps. It is signed using the privatekey of KDC-H. The PA-PK-AS-REQ ensures replay protection as well as message integrity and authentication.
3) The remote KDC verifies the PA-PK-AS-REQ and builds an XKDCP-REP message which consists of two main parts: The Ticket and an EncTGSRepPart. The EncTGSRepPart is encrypted using a newly generated inter-realm key "K(KDC-H,KDC-R)". The EncTicketPart of the Ticket is encrypted using the secret key of the service SVC "K(SVC-R,KDC-R)". However, if the requested ticket is a cross-realm TGT (this can be determined by checking whether the principal name of the requested service matches "krbtgt/S@R"), then KDC-R creates a cross-realm TGT (as specified in [6] ) using the newly generated key "K(KDC-H,KDC-R)" instead.
Both the Ticket and the EncTGSRepPart contain a session-key field. The remote KDC places a freshly generated key "SK(C,SVC-R)" in these fields. KDC-R also adds a PA-PK-AS-REP (a PKINIT reply) to the XKDCP-REP message. The PA-PK-AS-REP contains the newly generated inter-realm key "K(KDC-H,KDC-R)" and is encrypted using the public key of KDC-H, then signed using the private key of KDC-R.
4) The home KDC decrypts the PA-PK-AS-REP using its private key and verifies the signature of KDC-R using KDC-R's public key. The interrealm key "K(KDC-H,KDC-R)" is then extracted from the PA-PK-AS-REP and used to decrypt the EncTGSRepPart of the XKDCP-REP message. The EncTGSRepPart is then encrypted using the session-key "SK(C,KDC-H)" shared with the client. The EncTGSRepPart and the Ticket (as provided by the remote KDC) are used to build a TGS-REP message for the client. The key "K(KDC-H,KDC-R)" is stored by the home KDC for future transactions with the remote KDC.
VI. RELATED WORKS AND EVALUATION
There have been a limited number of related works addressing the same Kerberos cross-realm authentication problems. The most relevant of these works are the PKCROSS protocol [14] and the Client-Friendly Crossrealm Protocol (CFCP) [15] . PKCROSS allows a realm to provide its local clients with TGTs for a remote realm. The TGT is obtained in one round-trip and clients can use it to obtain service tickets using a TGS exchange with the remote KDC. If the home and remote KDC do not share a secret key (the worst case scenario), the home KDC uses the PKCROSS protocol to create such key. The client-Friendly cross-realm proposal has two modes. The Dynamic Cross mode, which follows the same principle as PKCROSS, and Recursive Ticketing mode, which delegates the cross-realm exchanges to the KDC. In the latter mode, the client entrusts the KDC with its TGS. The KDC then "impersonates" the client and performs all necessary TGS exchanges with intermediary realms.
The following provides side by side comparison of XKDCP, with the related works mentioned above. For the purpose of the comparison, we assume a scenario where a client is attempting to reach a service in a remote realm and that there are three intermediary realms in the authentication path (Scenario depicted in Figure. 2).
Since our focus is on multi-domain authentications in large-scale ubiquitous environments, the main concerns are the load on the smart nodes which are usually devices with low computational power, and the number of messages exchanged over the Internet during a cross-realm authentication. These two parameters will constitute our performance comparison criteria as depicted in Table . II.
As shown in Table. VI, while alternative cross-realm authentication models surely improved over Kerberos's legacy cross-realm authentication model, the XKDCP cross-realm authentication protocol provides the best performance combination of reduced client load and minimal inter-domain latency when compared to other existing approaches. When compared to the best case scenario of PKCROSS, XKDCP reduces client load by 50%.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provided an overview of the dependability and security issues in the Kerberos crossrealm authentication protocol. The issues come from the fact that Kerberos relies on intermediary realms when authenticating a user to a service deployed in a different Kerberos realm. The XKDCP protocol which leverages PKINIT to remove the dependency on intermediary realms achieves better dependability and scalability. The public key authentication based on an established Public Key Infrastructure allows two realms to dynamically build trust without prior provisioning of pre-shared symmetric keys as it is the case with the current cross-realm model. Furthermore, the XKDCP protocol is a client-friendly in the sense that it reduces the load on client. This feature is very beneficial for devices with low computational power that need to obtain authentication credentials within bounded delays. Compared to related works, XKDCP reduces client load by at least 50% and reduces the number of inter-domain exchanges during cross-realm authentication to a single round-trip.
Finally, the technology upon which the XKDCP protocol relies, namely PKINIT and Kerberos, are trusted technologies specified by the IETF. XKDCP inherits these security soundness since it does not semantically modify the Kerberos authentication protocol nor PKINIT.
